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of administrative considerations but which can be manipulated so
that its implementation happily results in approximately a fifty per cent
reduction in the federal diversity case load. The theoretical premise is
not at all difficult to locate in the Institute's thinking:
[A] ccess to the fedaral courts because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties should be permitted only upon a showing
of strong reasons therefor and only to the extent that these
reasons justify. This premise is grounded upon the political
axiom, advanced by Hamilton in justification of the federal
judicial power, that judicial and legislative authority should be
coextensive. So long as federal courts continue to decide cases
arising under State law without the possibility of State review,
the State's judicial power is less extensive than its legislative
power; this is an undesirable interference with State autonomy.3
However, as it is expressed this premise has some gaping holes in it:
what the Institute considers to be included in the concept of "state autonomy," how state autonomy is being interfered with, or why this interference is undesirable are never explained. But perhaps the most striking defect in the premise is that it bears no obvious relationship at all to
the initial motive for the study-the need for more efficient administration in the federal courts.
It is hoped that the studies made in this symposium will be relevant
in evaluating both the theoretical validity of this premise and the practical
usefulness of the Institute's proposals.

THE OPERATION OF FEDERALISM IN DIVERSITY:
ERIE'S CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
In the most general terms, the great debate over diversity jurisdiction has concerned itself with the problem of the proper functional limitations upon the federal courts exercising that jurisdiction. Although
most of the debaters share a common belief that diversity jurisdiction has
become an integral part of the governmental structure within which the
limiting standards must be developed, occasional critics have offered
the ultimate solution-abolition of diversity jurisdiction.1 The more
3. A. L. I., op. cit. szpra at 49.
1. See, e.g., Boner, Erie v. Tompkins, A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEXAS L
Rtv. 509, 619 (1962) ; Clark, State Law in, the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946) ; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship
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specific question around which the unresolved dispute has centered has
been framed in terms of whether or not a federal court should determine
private controversies by an "independent" judgment on the law as well
as on the facts.2 If it is granted that a federal court sitting in a diversity
case must normally bow to state determinations of substantive policy,
the question then becomes largely a matter of choosing which state determinations of substantive policy to apply and the methodology of their
application. The choice of standards in these matters has, however, been
often determined by resort to doctrines developed in state courts for the
resolution of "conflict of laws" problems.
It is a generally accepted proposition that the constitution imposes
certain limitations upon the state courts' independent choice of substantive
doctrines including those applicable to "conflicts of laws" problems.' The
full faith and credit and due process clauses of the constitution mark the
outer limits of the power of a state to impose its own notions of substantive policy upon litigants who have invoked its jurisdiction where
the operative facts of the case indicate substantial contact with another
governmental authority. ' In such cases the constitutional restraint is
negative in nature; that is, a state court may impose its own notions of
policy upon litigants only so long as that imposition does not transgress
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A.J. 449 (1933) ; Currie, Change of Venie
and the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CI. L. REv. 405 (1955) ; Frankfurter, A Note on Di,ersity Jurisdiction- n Reply to Professor Yntema 79 U. PA. L. Rnv. 1097 (1931) ; Hart,
The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489 (1954); Hill, The
Erie Doctrine and the Conflict of Laws, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958) ; Kurland, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, The Supreme Court and the Erie Doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67
YALE L.J. 187 (1957) ; Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial
Code, 13 LAW & CoNmEMP. PROB. 216 (1948) ; Yntema & Jaf fin, Prelimnary Analysis of
ConcurrentJurisdictiom, 79 U. PA. L. REv. 869 (1931).
2. See, Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);
Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928) ; Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
3. Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the
Judicial Function, 26 U. CHl. L. REv. 9 (1959) ; Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The
Lawyers' Clause of the Constitution, 45 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1945); Leflar, Constitutional
Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CON
FP. PROB. 706 (1963) ; Ross, Has the
Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law?, 15 MINN. L. REv. 161
(1931) ; Stumberg, Choice of Law and the Constitution, 10 Jou,. PuB. LAw 289 (1961);
Weintraub, Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on; a State's Choice of
Law, 44 IoWA L. RPEv. 449 (1959). See also, Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930) ; Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947) ; Hughes
v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951) ; Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
4. See, e.g., Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 516 (1953): "The full
faith and credit clause does not compel a state to adopt any particular set of rules of
conflict of laws; it merely sets certain minimum requirements which each state must observe when asked to apply the law of a sister state." (Emphasis added.) In a sense,
of course, this is a positive mandate; but pragmatically it acts as negative restraint upon
the power of a state to enforce its own notions of policy without regard to the policy of
sister states.
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constitutional limits. The "negative restraint"5 approach has so dominated the constitutional aspects of traditional choice of law thinking that
it has been carried over into the federal courts where under the authority
of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins the legal profession continually has viewed the
authority of the federal courts to impose independent notions of law upon
litigants invoking federal jurisdiction to be subject to similar negative
restraints. It is the thesis of this note that such a view of the Erie doctrine, placing the emphasis on negative restrictions, is improper and misleading insofar as it has tended to obscure the more fundamental constitutional concepts that underlie the Erie opinion.'
In order to adequately develop this thesis it is necessary to explore
the fundamental constitutional and theoretical concepts relating to diversity jurisdiction. These concepts have historically given rise to two specific though interrelated problems. The first problem, which is here
characterized as the problem of "federalism," involves not only the interrelationship of the state and federal governments but also the relationships between two or more state judicial systems that may be brought into conflict in diversity cases. The second problem is characterized "jurisprudential" or "methodological"; and though it necessarily is connected
to the problem of federalism, it gives rise to an entirely separate and
distinct problem. That problem is essentially a problem of determining
the nature and sources of legal rules applicable in a given case.
The recognition of the distinction between the two basic problems of
diversity litigation has been obscured by the efforts to find a single
simple solution to a complex problem. As each solution has failed
to provide a satisfactory means of determining the problems inherent in
diversity litigation, it has been discarded and a new one adopted. The result has been that instead of attempting to evolve a methodology for the
5. While the courts have not used the term "negative restraint," the negative aspects
of the more recent approach to the law to be applied in a diversity case are clear. The
courts have thus tended to emphasize what is not allowed in terms of choice of law rather
than what mnst be done in that regard. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., in Guaranty Trust Co.
v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The positive emphasis, however, has been used. See Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, 309 F.2d 553 (1962).
6. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7. See, EHRENzwEiG, CoNFLicT oF LAws 143 (1962):
[D]istinguished commentators continue to attribute considerable vitality to due
process as a vehicle of an at least negative constitutional choice of law. Yet we
have noted that where this approach has so far been used, it has failed. (Emphasis added.)
This comment seems to go to the heart of the matter. As multiplicity of contact in the
operative facts of a litigation increases, something more than "negative constitutional
choice of law" is needed. Instead of telling a federal court what law it cannot apply to
a given litigation, the court should know what sources of law it must apply. The decision in Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), did not resolve that question.
See infra note 33.
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resolution of a complex problem, the problem has been denominated as
being "really rather simple, once one fully grasps it." The failure of
that approach is now apparent and efforts must begin anew to find an
effective means of resolving issues that do not lend themselves to simple
solutions. It should be remembered, however, that the complexity of the
problem is not an excuse for the failure to provide adequate standards.
The old shibboleths of "creativity of the judicial system," "judicial independence," etc. will not and cannot do the job-the issue must be faced
squarely.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM

In 1841, John Swift, the endorsee of a bill of exchange in consideration for a pre-existing debt, brought an action against George W. Tysen
(Tyson),8 the acceptor of the bill, in the Circuit Court for the Southern
District of New York. The judges were equally divided as to the applicable law, and the question, whether a pre-existing debt was a valuable
consideration for a negotiable instrument, was certified to the Supreme
Court of the United States where the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Story, held that the pre-existing debt was a valuable consideration.9 In
order to reach this conclusion Story had to refute the arguments of counsel for the defense that the Rules of Decision Act' required the application of the rule developed by the courts of New York. Not so, held
Story, for "in the ordinary use of language, it will hardly be contended,
that the decisions of courts constitute laws. They are, at most, only evidence of what the laws are, and are not, of themselves, laws."11 According to Story, who had recently finished a treatise on commercial law, the
law was that a pre-existing debt was a valuable consideration for a
negotiable instrument." Story took the position that there was a national law and a state law. If the state had expressed its view of the law
in a statute as opposed to a decision of a court, it was state-created law,
albeit in derogation of the common law, and was to be followed in a
S. The name of the defendant in the famous case of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), was apparently spelled incorrectly by the reporter. See, Teton, The
Story of Swift v. Tyson, 35 ILL. L. REv. 519, 530 n.2 (1941).
9. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
10. Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 92, Rev. Stat. § 721, 28 U.S.C.
§ 725 (1940 ed.) :
That the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in trials at common law in courts of the United States in
cases where they apply.
11. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18.
12. The effect of Mr. Justice Story's eminence in the area of commercial law upon the result of the Swift case is told in GRAY, THE NATrE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAw
253-256 (Beacon ed. 1963).
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proper case in a national court. Otherwise, the law of the case was to be
taken from the common law, a pre-existing corpus which every judge
could discover for himself.
Story was faced with the two basic problems under consideration
here: the choice of law or "federalism" question, and the source of law
or "methodological" question. While he did not directly deal with the
first problem, implicit in his decision were two fundamental assumptions.
First was a concept of the distribution of power in a federal republic on
a formal functional basis; that is, a belief that the power of a state to
enact laws was separated from the corresponding federal power by a
clearly defined line.1" This view of "federalism" was, of course, the
product of thinking then current.' The second fundamental assumption
implicit in Story's opinion was also the product of the prevailing concept
of the nature of legal rules, for the concept of an immutable, unchanging
common law may have been necessary to that predominantly non-urban
society because of the relative inability of the legal system to collate the
decisions of widely separated courts. Indeed, the constitutions of many
states declared that the common law was to prevail where unchanged by
statute, and the courts often expressed the view that statutes in derogation
of the common law were to be strictly construed. Justice Story's concept of general law was therefore nothing more than recognition of what
was generally deemed to be the "proper" rule. 5
For seventy-five years the federal courts followed the rule of Swift
v. Tyson, often extending it beyond the general commercial law that Story
had found to be a coherent body of principles.1" But the old society of
13. See, e.g., Holmes, J., in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277
U.S. 218, 223 (1928) :
In those days it was not recognized as it is today that most of the distinctions of
the law are distinctions of degree. If the states had any power it was assumed
that they had all power, and that the necessary alternative was to deny it altogether. But this court which so often has defeated the attempt to tax in
certain ways can defeat an attempt to discriminate or otherwise go too far without wholly abolishing the power to tax. The power to tax is not the power to
destroy while this court sits.
14. See, GRAY, op. cit. supra note 12, at 259.
15. "A survey of the hundred years ending in 1788 concluded that 'not a single
book that could be called a treatise intended for the use of professional lawyers was published in the British Colonies and the American States. All of the books within this
period which by any stretch of definition might be regarded as legal treatises were for
the use of laymen."' JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 34 (2d ed. 1963). Thus in the half century preceding Swift v. Tyson, the
growth of legal literature as a source of law began. Of the men who wrote and thus
made the law of that day, Joseph Story was perhaps the most eminent. See GRAY, THE
NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW chs. X, XI (Beacon ed. 1963).
16. See Note, Swift v. Tyson, Its Antecedents and Rise, and the Inthnations of Its
Fall, in HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 614-421
(1953).
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the nineteenth century gave way to the twentieth century, to pressures of
war, economic advancement, increased transportation, and modern communication. In this rapidly evolving society, the legal system lagged behind. As legal relationships became increasingly complex by virtue of
divergent factual problems, the number of "rules" grew. The Law to
which justice Story had so blithely referred was becoming increasingly
particularized and diversified. Partly because of the increasing volume
of "new law" and partly in spite of it, the federal courts, with an occasional intimation to the contrary,1" increasingly imposed their own notions of law and policy upon litigants who invoked their jurisdiction. The
courts seemed to ignore what is now regarded as a truism, that any litigation which raises a policy question must perforce result in a policy decision no matter whether the court faces that question or not. Thus
under the guise of an independent judgment on the law the federal courts
applied increasingly divergent policy determinations to litigations before
them. The failure or reluctance of the federal courts to recognize their
function as a positive enforcing sector of government and the failure to
apply valid state policy determinations led litigants to base their choice of
forum upon the availability of a policy determination that tended to effectuate the particular interest they intended to protect. Beyond simple
forum shopping, moreover, potential litigants to quote "create" diversity
of citizenship where an applicable state rule foreclosed the result obtainable in a federal court."
Thus the historic justification for diversity
jurisdiction, freedom from prejudice, often gave way to a far less tenable
basis; diversity jurisdiction became just another tool in a lawyer's bag
of tricks. The ultimate misuse of diversity jurisdiction came in the infamous Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co."
case, where a federal district court in Kentucky virtually overruled the
clear public policy of the state of Kentucky as expressed by the Kentucky
Supreme Court.
In the Taxi case, a Kentucky taxicab corporation and a railroad had
entered into an exclusive dealing contract which the Kentucky courts had
consistently held to be unenforceable as against public policy. When an17. See, Bradley, J., in Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883). After referring
to the deference accorded to local real estate law and state statutes and constitutions,
Bradley said:
Acting on these principals, founded as they are on comity and good sense, the
courts of the United States, without sacrificing their own dignity as independent
tribunals, endeavor to avoid, and in most cases do avoid, any unseemly conflict
with the well-considered decisions of the state courts. 107 U.S. at 34.
The court, however, declined to follow the construction of a state statute made by a
state court.
18. See, HART & WECHSLER, op. cit. supra, note 15, at 918.
19. 276 U.S. 518 (1928).
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other taxi company began to infringe upon the exclusive contract, the
plaintiff, having no remedy in the Kentucky courts, resorted to the "created diversity" device by dissolving the Kentucky corporation and reincorporating in Tennessee. Having thus created the requisite diversity
of citizenship, the plaintiff brought suit in the federal district court
where an injunction issued in clear contradiction of Kentucky public
policy. Upon appeal the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Holmes, with whom Justices Brandeis and Stone concurred, entered
a burning dissent. Attacking the "unconstitutional assumption of power
by the courts of the United States, which no lapse of time or respectable
array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct,"2 Holmes laid bare
the basic fallacy:
Therefore I think it proper to state what I think the fallacy is.
-The often repeated proposition of this and the lower courts is
that the parties are entitled to an independent judgment of matters of general law. By that phrase is meant matters that are
not governed by any law of the United States or by any statute
of the State-matters that in States other than Louisiana are
governed in most respects by what is called the common law. It
is through this phrase that what I think the fallacy [is] comes
in. ..
It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one
august corpus, to understand which clearly is the only task of
any court concerned. If there were such a transcendental body
of law outside of any particular State, but obligatory within it
unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the United
States might be right in using their independent judgment as to
what it was. But there is no such body of law. .

.

.

The com-

mon law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of
that State existing by the authority of that State, without regard
to what it may have been in England or anywhere else. .. .2'
The Holmes dissent has largely been viewed as only an interesting
part of the historical evolution that led to the Erie decision, but in view of
the fact that the author of the Erie opinion, Justice Brandeis, joined in
the Taxi dissent the Holmes position should not be dismissed so lightly.
It is significant to consider the relationships between the Holmes Taxi
dissent and the Erie opinion. Holmes did more than refute the notion
20. Id. at 532 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 532-34.
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that law existed independently of the judgment of a court based on its
construction of the facts. More importantly he urged that the courts of
the United States were constitutionally compelled to apply state "law" to
a cause of action arising within a particular state where the "law of that
state, exist[ed] by the authority of that State."22 What angered Justice
Holmes, and rightly so, was a federal district court sitting in the state of
Kentucky overruling the considered judgment of the highest appellate
court of that state on a matter of state policy. To do so was to allow the
district court to sit as an appellate court in judgment of the validity of a
state policy that, absent constitutional infirmities, could not have been
reviewed by the United States Supreme Court on certiorari to the Kentucky Supreme Court. Clearly, the actions of the district court had violated any conceivable concept of state-federal relations. A wholly independent forum, with no political duty to the state and with minimal interest at best in the determination of state policy, had imposed upon the
state a rule that was beyond doubt contrary to the rule that would have
obtained in the state courts. It does not follow, however, that federal
courts were necessarily precluded under the Holmes view from using their
independent notion of law where the law was unclear; nor were federal
courts necessarily precluded from exercising independent judgments on
the facts where an authoritative state agency had not acted. In fact, Justice Holmes expressly approved the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson as limited
and thus at least by implication, if not in fact, held that a federal court
need not feel bound by dicta or non-authoritative expressions of state
policy.
The Holmes dissent was an important departure from Story's view
of the two basic problems. Where Story had virtually ignored the primacy of the states to control the actions of their own citizens when those
actions were litigated in the federal courts, Holmes believed that where
a state had authoritatively made a judgment on a matter within its sphere
of interest, the decision of the state was conclusive. Secondly, where
Justice Story had viewed law as existing a priori,Holmes announced that
law could not exist independently of the judgment of courts vis-a-vis
litigations, here state courts vis-a-vis prior state litigations. Holmes
viewed authoritative determinations of state policy as precluding federal
"review" in the guise of a district judge's independent judgment on the
law and facts of a diversity action. Implicit in Holmes' theory of law
was the notion that where the state had not acted in regard to a particular
legal construct, there was no constitutional imperative binding on a fed22. Id. at 533.
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eral trial court to attempt to implement such "non-policy." To view the
Holmes opinion otherwise is to commit the same error that was so forcefully pointed out in his dissent, for to do so is merely to reverse the Swift
fallacy and say that while there is no "transcendental august corpus" of
federal common law, that somehow there is a "transcendental august
corpus" of state law.
Additional light on the constitutional aspects of diversity jurisdiction was supplied two years after the Taxi case when Justice Brandeis
wrote the unanimous opinion in Home Insurawe Co. v. Dick.2' The suit
was an in. rem proceeding brought in a Texas court by an out-of-state litigant to enforce a contract made and performed in Mexico. The contract
included a one-year limitation clause on suits brought under it, and the
defendant raised that clause as an absolute defense to the action. Texas,
however, had declared by statute that such limitations of less than two
years were void as against public policy, and the Texas courts in light of
that statute refused to allow the defense. On appeal the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that it was a violation of the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment for Texas to impose a state policy in
regard to limitation clauses where "the laws of Texas [and] the Texas
2
courts were invoked for [the sole] purpose [of] bringing this suit." '
The critical point in the Dick case is the position of the state court.
The Texas court had absolutely no contact with the operative facts of
the case except that the assignee of the policy happened to have attachable
property in Texas. Consequently, although Dick was not a diversity case,
the Texas court was in a position similar to that of a federal court
sitting in a diversity of citizenship case, since the federal courts exercise jurisdiction by virtue of a different governmental authority than the
one which has primary control over the operative facts that give rise to
the case. The federal court, like the court in Dick, must thus pay allegiance to two sovereigns, the sovereign which confers its jurisdiction and
the sovereign which has the primary power to regulate the activities which
give rise to the litigation. The basic concept in the Dick case is that a
forum which has minimal contacts with the actions which give rise to the
legal rights and duties involved in the litigation may not impose upon the
parties a policy which is clearly contrary to the intent and purpose of the
agreement between them, where that agreement was valid under the laws
of the jurisdiction in which it was made.
Out of the development of the Erie doctrine, from the static analysis
of Justice Story to the enlightened views of Holmes and Brandeis, a more
23. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
24. Id. at 408.
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or less clear constitutional position begins to emerge." That position is
tied to the due process clause of the fifth amendment and views the role
of a federal court in diversity cases as one of arbitration of conflicting
state interests. The argument is related to Justice Marshall's dictum that
the judicial power should be co-extensive with the legislative power.
Within the unitary government of a single state, the courts and the legislatures both act as policy making sectors of the government. Thus when
a court decides a case arising solely within the state there is no disparity
between the extent of its legislative and judicial jurisdictions. The parties
are there subject only to the governmental authority of a single state.
When the court determines policy for that particular litigation there is no
chance of conflict between that state and other states since the litigation,
ex hypothesi, has arisen solely within the forum state. Conversely, in a typical "conflict of laws" situation, the parties to the litigation have contacts
with states other than the forum state so that the legislative jurisdictions
of the two states may conflict. While the forum owes allegiance to its own
sovereign, the full faith and credit clause and the due process clause of the
constitution require that in certain instances the court give effect to the
policy of another state. Thus the court is forced to resolve the conflict
between its own legislative jurisdiction and that of another state. In so
doing it is perfectly proper for the court to give first consideration to the
policy of its own state, subject only to certain negative limitations upon
the exercise of its legislative jurisdiction, such as those imposed by the
full faith and credit and due process clauses of the constitution.
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,2" the same concept of negative restraint upon the
extension of legislative jurisdiction was followed in federal diversity
cases. Thus the forum (that is, the federal court) was deemed to have
the power to extend its law-making powers to the facts of the litigation
25. It will be observed that while Holmes and Brandeis were expressing a theory
in regard to what courts cannot do, i.e., that they cannot impose independent notions of
policy upon litigants in certain cases, they expressed that theory in positive terms, i.e., the
court must apply the policy of the authority which regulates the operative facts of a

given litigation.
26. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Harry Tompkins, a Pennsylvania resident, was struck by
a protruding door on a passing train as he walked along the tracks in Hughestown,
Pennsylvania. Tompkins brought suit against the Erie in a federal district court in New
York state, where the Erie had its main office. The Erie urged that under Pennsylvania
law, as declared by its highest court, a person walking along the right of way, as opposed
to crossing it, was deemed to be a trespasser. Tompkins denied that such was the law of
Pennsylvania; in addition he urged that the proper rule was to be drawn from the "general law" since Pennsylvania had no statute on the matter. The trial judge ruled in
Tompkins' favor, and the jury returned a judgment of $30,000. The Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed, 90 F.2d 603 (1937), and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 302

U.S. 671 (1937).
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before it, subject only to the additional negative restraints of state statutes
and rules of property. But Justice Brandeis, in the beginning of his
analysis of the constitutional problem in Erie, noted that the judicial
power should be subject to.the same limitations imposed on the legislative
power. Since-the legislative jurisdiction of federal government did not
extend to the typical diversity case, it followed that the federal courts'
policy-making power did not extend to such cases. Conversely, the legislative power to govern the transactions in question was vested in the
states that had the primary authority to control the actions of the litigants.
Thus it could be said that the federal legislative authority in diversity
jurisdiction was not limited by a negative restraint; it was in fact nonexistent. The duty then devolved upon the federal court to apply state
policy in a positive manner, fully and completely and not subject to the
federal notions of what that policy ought to be.
Justice Brandeis, speaking for a majority of five in Erie (the sixth
vote being Justice Reed concurring in the result) held that in applying the
doctrine of Swift v. Tyson "this court and the lower courts have invaded
rights which in our opinion are reserved by the constitution to the several
states."2 7 That language has been productive of much debate. Many
observers have assumed that Brandeis was invoking the authority of the
tenth amendment; and an even greater number, including the Supreme
Court of the United States, have tended to reject any suggestion of a
constitutional foundation for Erie.2" But viewed in the light of the Taxi
dissent and the Brandeis opinion in Dick, the essential due process basis
of the Erie opinion becomes clear.
Erie merely holds that the legislative jurisdiction over the operative
facts in a diversity case is vested in state authority." When that holding
27. 304 U.S. at 80.
28. That view is based upon an assumption that Brandeis would never decide a constitutional issue unless it was necessary and that it -was unnecessary in this case. See,
e.g., Justice Brandeis' views on the methodology of deciding a constitutional question as
expressed in his concurring opinion in Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288 (1936). It
should be noted however that the constitutional issue was raised in Erie, albeit obliquely:
The Circuit Court of Appeals is not here exercising the legitimate function of
preventing state favoritism as between citizens of different states; it is itself
creating a discrimination.
Brief in Support of the Petition for Certiorari, p. 30 (emphasis added). See also, e.g.,
CuRmE, SELEcTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 443 (1963) :
Looking at conflict-of-laws problems in terms of the policies expressed by the
respective laws and of the interests of the respective states in the furtherance
of their policies (that is to say, regarding conflict-of-laws problems as essentially problems of construction and interpretation of 'municipal' laws) has more
than anything else helped me appreciate the sound basis for the Erie doctrineeven the constitutional basis, which in 1955 I was disposed to treat derisively.
29. See Hart, The Relations between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. R v. 489,
512 (1954) : "[T]he essential rationale of the Erie opinion [is] the need of recognizing
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is combined with the Dick premise that it is a violation of the due process
clause for the forum to impose its notions of policy upon a litigation over
which it has no legislative authority, the constitutional basis of Erie becomes axiomatic: since the federal court has no legislative power over the
litigation, due process and not some vague notions of "federalism" requires the federal court to bow to the policy of the sovereign that does
in fact have legislative jurisdiction, the state.
However, instead of placing emphasis upon the due process basis of
the Erie opinion, the federal courts have fastened upon other language in
the opinion:
[E]xcept in matters governed by the Federal constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of
the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by
its legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is
not a matter of federal concern."0
From this language the courts have developed a body of "Erie Jurisprudence" that views the Erie doctrine as a mere formalistic device for
achieving federal deference to state law. That the development of that
"jurisprudence" has been highly unsatisfactory in terms of the judicial
process is seldom debated."
THE "ERIE JURISPRUDENCE"

At first the federal courts did not deal directly with questions of
"which state's law" applied. They assumed, as had Justice Brandeis in
invoking Pennsylvania law in Erie, that the law of some particular state
would apply, and from the opinions could be gleaned an indication that a
"federal common-law of conflicts" was developing. 2 But in 1941, the
the state courts as organs of coordinate authority with other branches of the state
government in the discharge of the constitutional functions of the states. ..."
30. 304 U.S. at 78. Note that this statement leaves at least four questions open:
1) What is "the law?" 2) Which state is "the state?" 3) Does "highest court" mean the
highest court that has decided the question or the court of last resort? and 4) Are
"statutes" and "decisions" the only authoritative sources of law? As will be seen the
later courts never faced these questions directly-instead they assumed the answers.
31. After discussing the basis of the Erie opinion in terms of "federalism," Professor Hart observed:
Partly by heightening awareness of the significance of issues of federal-state
relationships, and partly by increasing the frequency with which questions of
choice of state law arose, Erie induced a reexamination of these problems. In
the course of this reexamination the Supreme Court since 1938 has persistently
depreciated the foundations of principle of Justice Brandeis' opinion and moved
steadily in the direction of degradation of federal justice.
The Relationsr Between State and FederalLaw, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489, 510 (1954).
32.

See, Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLum. L. Ray.

489, 514 n. 84 (1954) :
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Supreme Court put such notions to rest in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co.33 where it held that the Erie opinion's words, "the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State," meant that federal courts must
apply the law of the state in which they sat, including specifically the
conflict of laws rules. The unarticulated major premise of Klaxon was
that the state in which the federal court sat would have been the forum
state but for diversity jurisdiction; and implicit in that premise is the view
that the law of the state in which the suit would have been brought is the
proper law to apply. But analysis of the realities of a law suit will reveal
that the federal forum state is not necessarily the state in which the suit
would have been brought. Aside from the obvious case of the Federal
Interpleader Act,"4 which in certain cases gives nation-wide jurisdiction
to a federal court and thus creates a forum that could not be obtained in
any state,3" the recent amendments to Federal Rule 4 may in many cases
allow resort to a federal court in a state in which suit could not have been
brought in a state court." In addition, a multitude of subjective factors
that are implicit in diversity cases govern the choice of forum where the
courts of two or more states are open to the plaintiff. Thus the so-called
evil of "forum shopping" is still a part of the judicial process; and, so
long as people persist in engaging in activities which cross state boundaries, the realities of forum shopping will remain. Klaxon may have
restricted forum shopping within state boundaries, but in so doing
Klaxon promoted forum shopping among federal courts in cases where a
choice of state jurisdictions was open to the plaintiff. 37
In Erie itself Justice Brandeis seemed to think that a federal court should think
The whole court assumed the same thing
for itself on conflicts problems ....
in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co..
Cf., Note, Application by Federal Courts of State Rides on Conflict of Laws, 41 CoLuM.
L.Ray. 1403 (1941).

33. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1958).

Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 22. Section 1335 enacted modifications of the basic interpleader statute adopted in 1911.
35. See, e.g., Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941). In Griffin a Texas administrator brought an action against a New York insurance company. The company
interpleaded the respondent, who had been assigned the policy to protect a business deal
in which he was involved with the decedent. The court held that Texas law would apply to defeat the rights of the respondent because he had no insurable interest. The
impossible factor in Griffin arises from the fact that only through the federal interpleader statute could the plaintiff have obtained personal jurisdiction over the respondent. Thus Texas law was applied to a case which would never have occurred but for diversity jurisdiction.
For an interesting comparison of the "duty" to apply Texas law with the propriety
of the choice, compare Currie, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Law: A Retraction,

27 U. CH i. L. REv. 341, 345-46 (1960), with, Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 754, 789 (1963).

36. See, Vestal, Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: The
x963 Changes in Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 1053 (1963).
CASES AND
MATERIALS 235-36
37. See CHEATHAM, CONFLICT OF LAWS -

NOTES
But the real problem in Klaxon is not that it failed to eliminate the
attractiveness of forum-shopping; the failure rather lies in the fact the
Klaxon effectively foreclosed the application of the Erie principal in a
great many cases. It is asserted here that Erie was a constitutionally
oriented case which was designed to recognize the primacy of the authority of a state to determine the policy upon which it will distribute justice
in relation to conduct with which it has substantial contact. If that is so,
then in determining which state's policy is to control the litigation the
Erie mandate imposes upon the federal courts a duty to define state interest in terms of the substantiality of contact with the operative facts of
litigation. Unlike conflicts situations that arise in state courts, the federal court must sit as a disinterested forum when it makes the initial determination of applicable law. The court at this juncture should weigh
the quantum of contact that the parties have with the states involved and
determine the proper means of accommodating the diverse interests involved. If the federal court is forced always to adopt the rule of the
state in which it sits it no longer is disinterested; it is disestablished. 8
So far as the conflict of laws doctrine of the forum state adequately
protects the interest of another state which had substantial contact with
the operative facts of the litigation, the Klaxon doctrine will work. But
many, if not most, states do not accord more than a modicum of deference to the interests of foreign states. Surely a federal court, which owes
no political allegiance to the state government, can and should accord, not
a modicum of deference, but full deference to the interests of a nonforum state. 9 Klaxon destroyed that principle insofar as it forced a federal court to adopt a conflict of laws rule which expresses the interest of
a state government in the choice of law in courts under its jurisdiction.
(1964): "Traditionally, in Anglo-American law, the defendant can be sued wherever
he can be served. . . . This situation provides a considerable opportunity for 'shopping
around' for a forum. The plaintiff may make the choice to harass the defendant, thus
hoping to get a better settlement; or he may bring the suit in a place where it is felt that
jury verdicts tend to be larger than elsewhere."; Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IoWA L. REv. 933 (1962). See also HART
& WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 918-19 (1953).

38. Cf. Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLUm. L. REv.
489, 515 (1954):
The Federal courts are in a peculiarly disinterested position to make a just determination as to which state's laws ought to apply where this is disputed. By

disabling them from doing this, the Supreme Court has not only impeded the
development of a sound body of private interstate law but has placed it within
the power of a plaintiff who can find the defendant in a state where he wants
him to make a choice of law for himself. Justice is not ordinarily served by
putting it in the hands of one of the litigants.
39. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754
(1963) ; text accompanying note 35 supra.
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That interest is, of course, inapposite in a federal court.4
If, as this discussion suggests, Erie demands an ad hoc independent
determination of the applicable law based upon the operative facts of the
case then before the court, does not the "ghost of Swift v. Tyson still walk
abroad somewhat shrunken in size, yet capable of much mischief ?""4
The answer is both yes and no. In the sense that independent ad hoc determinations might create greater disparity between the courts of the
forum state and the federal courts in the forum state, the answer is, of
course, yes. But uniformity with the forum state may not be a proper
result. Uniformity is a laudable concept but it should not be applied so
as to preclude the invocation of any other factor that is important to the
case. The result that Erie approached was conformity to Pennsylvania
doctrines while the trial court was located in New York. If that result
was reached by reference to New York conflicts law, Brandeis apparently
thought that law was as clear as the constitutional law that he based his
decision upon, for not only did he fail to cite any authority, he also failed
to mention any choice of law problem.42 It must be recognized that, if
the law applied in a given case is in conformity with the law of a state
40. Professors Currie and Cavers have finally agreed that the Klaxon doctrine is
proper. But Professor Currie is not prepared to go the full route. He would seem to
agree with Professor Cavers that when the state in which the federal court sits is a
"disinterested third state" (a la Dick?) that it should not be literally bound by the conflicts law of the state. Currie, op. cit. supra note 39, at 785-90; see also Cavers, The
Changing Choice-of-Law Processand the Federal Courts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 732
(1963). But one is led to wonder if in fact a federal court is not by definition always a
disinterested forum.
41. Magruder, J., in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940).
42. Justice Brandeis remanded the case in order that the policy of Pennsylvania be
determined. That remand would seem to be a clear indication of the "positive" aspect
of Erie, for Erie did not hold that federal courts must act as courts of the state in which
they sit. It merely held that if the Pennsylvania trespass rule as declared in Falchetti v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 307 Pa. 203, 160 A. 859 (1932), governed the case, that it must be
applied. And compare Justice Brandeis in Hinderlinder v. La Plata River Co., 304 U.S.
92, 110 (1938): "Whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two states is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the
statutes nor the decisions of either state can be conclusive." In La Plata, decided the
same day as Erie, Justice Brandeis recognized that conflicts of interest between two
states cannot and should not be left to the determination of one of the parties. That
such a rationale is applicable to policy conflicts between two states in a diversity action
seems self-evident

See also THrE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Hamilton)

(italics in original)

And if it be a just principle, that every government ought to possess the means
of executing its omn provisios, by its ozwt authority, it will follow, that in order
to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to
which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to
preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens are opposed to another
state or its citizens. To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision
against all evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be
committed to that tribunal, which, having no local attachments, will be likely to
be impartial . . . [and] will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to
the principles on which it is founded.

NOTES
that a federal judge has found to have a more substantial contact than
the forum state, the apparent lack of "uniformity" may be dissolved, for
"uniformity" as a constitutional standard is not necessarily limited to
uniformity within the forum state.4"
Having emasculated half of the constitutional aspects of Erie, the
United States Supreme Court turned to the methodology involved in sifting out the state rules which should apply to a given litigation. Brandeis
had apparently endorsed the traditional "substance-procedure" distinction in Erie by his acceptance of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934;4 and
for a time the federal courts, in attempting to determine what kind of
state law should be followed, struggled with the application of that concept. It was quickly discovered, however, that the mere labeling of a
legal rule as "substantive" or "procedural" did not provide a ready answer
to the methodological problem.4" A "procedural" rule could have highly
"substantive" effects insofar as it precludes a litigant from enforcing an
otherwise valid claim or insofar as it encroaches upon other, "substantive" rights.'3 The prime example is the effect of a statute of limitation,
which courts had long recognized as being a hybrid within the penumbra
43. See, e.g., Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). A transfer to another
district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958) does not require or allow a change in
applicable law. The new forum must apply "the state law that would have been applied
if there had been no change in venue." The result in Van Dusen seems clearly correct,
but is not the fact that one state is entitled to legal deference over another state a
sounder reason for the result? Does not rigid application of "the forum" as a standard
for choosing law act as a lex locus delicti in reverse?
44. A contrary opinion might be formed from the Brandeis "dissent" to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; see Letter of Transmittal, 308 U.S. 649
(1939). But compare his approach to interstate conflicts of workmen's compensation
law in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) ; Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U.S. 221
(1931). As Professor Freund has said, "he recognized that the important and relevant
function of a constitutionalist was the allocation of public power." Freund, Mr. Jlstice
Brandeis in MR. JUSTICE 177, 191 (1964).
45. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940) ; and compare Rutledge, J., in
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (dissenting opinion) :
The words "substantive" and "procedural" or "remedial" are not talismanic.
Merely calling a legal question by one or the other does not resolve it otherwise
than as a purely authoritarian performance. But they have come to designate in
a broad way large and distinctive legal domains within the greater one of the
law and to mark, though often indistinctly or with overlapping limits, many
divides between such regions.
46. See, e.g., Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1
(1940):
So far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in public policy in a matter
so deeply touching the sensibilities of people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules
for the more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side of
the federal courts. I deem a requirement as to the invasion of the person to
stand on a very different footing from questions pertaining to the discovery of
documents, pre-trial procedure and fair conduct of litigation.
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of both "substance" and "procedure." The "substance-procedure" distinction, unworkable as it was, recognized that many rules applicable to
state litigation did not embody basic state policies that were constitutionally operative in federal diversity litigation. Thus, the distinction at least
had the merit of viewing law from its source-policy leads to a legal conclusion and not vice-versa. But the Court in, Guaranty Trwst Co. v.
York," reversed that necessary step by concentrating on the result of
policy rather than on what the policy was in fact. York thus solved the
problem of methodology by resorting to the rules that had in fact controlled a given litigation in a state forum. In so doing York answered
the "how" question but ignored the "why" or Erie question.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the York majority, held that
the Erie doctrine meant that "the accident of diversity jurisdiction should
not lead to a substantially different result"4 than would have obtained in
the courts of the state in which the federal court sat. The question to
which York should have addressed itself was the failure of the "substanceprocedure" distinction to adequately define "valid state interest." But
the Frankfurter opinion does not deal with that problem. Instead it proceeds from the assumption that state interest is inexorably manifested by
the result of a given lawsuit. It then follows a fortiori that if federal
courts merely act as a "court of the state""8 in which they sit, accommodation of state interest will be achieved. That conclusion follows only if the
state interest has been specifically involved in a closely analogous lawsuit.
By adopting Klaxot's resolution of the determination of "which state's
law applied" York fell heir to Klaxron's emasculation of the Erie doctrine,
and insofar as it adopted the position that a hypothetical state court decision would embody the operative policy of the state, the York opinion ignored the plain fact that policy is found in the source of law rather than
47. 326 U.S. 99 (1945). The suit was a class action on behalf of noteholders who
had refused to exchange those notes for stock under a plan instigated by Guaranty Trust
Co. The action was based upon an alleged breach of trust by Guaranty. At the trial
level a motion to dismiss was granted and on appeal the Second Circuit held that the
dismissal was improper. Moreover, the court held that the federal court sitting in equity
was not 'bound to follow the state statute of limitations. 143 F.2d 503 (1943). The
Supreme Court granted certiorari, 323 U.S. 693, and reversed the decision of the court
of appeals.
It may well be that the state policy underlying its statute of limitations should bind
a federal court sitting in a diversity case, but the means by which the court arrived at
that conclusion are the subject of much wonderment and debate.
48. 326 U.S. at 101.
49. Id. at 109: "The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins is
that for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal
court instead of in a state court a block away should not lead to a substantially different
result." It is from this language, apparently, that the notion that a federal court must
act as another "court of the state" has arisen. See HART & WECHSLER, THEFEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTEm

659, 660 (1953).

NOTES

the outcome of a particular litigation."0
The major faults of the York opinion were two: first, Frankfurter
carried the Erie concept of federalism to an absurd degree. Federalism
implies a viable interaction between the states involved in a diversity suit
and between those states and the national government. Federalism does
not imply or permit abject submission by federal courts to the "law" of
the forum state. Moreover, the outcome-determinative analysis ignores
a crucial point: the interest in federal litigation is not limited to policy
of the states involved. Aside from the federal need to protect the litigants in a fair adjudication of their respective interests, there is the federal interest in the integrity of the federal judicial process.
In contrast to the unwarranted "extension" of federalism, the York
opinion regressed in regard to the correlative jurisprudential problem. "
In answering the question of the source of the law to be applied, Frankfurter returned to the unhappy jurisprudence of Swift v. Tyson. He
seemed to assume that there was an "august corpus" of state law, "to
understand which dearly is the only task of any court concerned." 2 Indeed "the ghost of Swift v. Tyson still walks abroad," for York failed, as
had the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, to recognize that the decision of a court
is policy in the highest sense of the word. In Swift the failure was to
recognize the inexorable policy-making function of the state courts, and
in York the failure was to recognize the equally inexorable policy-making
function of a federal court, even when it purports to "follow" state
"law." Federal district courts have made and will continue to make
policy for the states in the form of judicial decrees. So long as we have
diversity jurisdiction, federalism demands that that policy-making function conform as closely as possible to the policy of the state that is most
concerned, and Erie embodies that demand. York destroys that conformation by committing the federal courts to an inflexible analytical model
50.

Since so many factors other than "policy" enter into the result of a given

litigation, e.g., infirmities in the fact-finding process, considerations of fairness, sociological factors, it is clear that the "outcome" of a given case does not always clearly
express basic policy considerations. Aside from the obvious case of conflicting policy
determinates applicable to a given litigation, the "policy" as applied is tailored to a given
set of facts. It follows then that mere "outcome" may be grossly misleading as an indicator of state policy to 'be applied to a different legal construct. Clearly, then, the
basic policy determinations of the controlling state agencies are not always manifest in
state court decisions. See, e.g., Fidelity Union Trust v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940) (following a state trial court on a matter of trust law where it was fairly clear that on appeal the decision would be reversed) ; Fair Share Organization, Inc. v. Mitnick, 134 Ind.
App. 675 (1963) (upholding an injunction against civil rights demonstrators on the basis
of the Indiana Fair Employment Statute, which expressed a basic state policy in favor of
non-discrimination in hiring practices).
51. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
52. Holmes, 3., in Black & White Taxicob & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928).
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which by its rigid nature often must preclude application of subtle state
policy determinations that cannot be found by the simple resort to case
law that York seems to suggest.53
While the court in York may have recognized that many state interests should not affect the outcome of a case where the trial is not in
the state courts, the difficulty of ascertaining which interests were which
by use of the old procedure-substance distinction led Justice Frankfurter
to the conclusion that uniformity of outcome was the paramount consideration."4 In so doing Frankfurter confused "outcome" and basic
policy, and the confusion on the part of others which followed the York
decision was rampant. Justice Frankfurter's close friend, Professor
Henry Hart, was later moved to observe that "the principle having no
apparent stopping place, the reach of the decisions is unclear.""
Even
Justice Frankfurter retreated from the fullest reach of the York decision
in his dissent in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.,"0 but the robot
had left its master. Finally the United States Supreme Court to some
extent relaxed the rigid York analysis in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop.5" In an obscure majority decision Justice Brennan held that state
rules of procedure which relate to the conduct of a trial may be dispensed
with where an overriding federal interest is involved. It may be that
the Byrd approach has signaled a return to the Erie principal and rejection of the York outcome-determinative test." But the Byrd doctrine
even taken at its most extreme extension appears to be limited to rules
regulating court procedure; if that is so, something more is needed. The
anomalous outcome-determinative test, the epitome of "negative restraint" upon the federal courts, should be discarded and the Erie approach of giving positive effect to state policy reinstated. The federal
53. See note 47 supra.
54.

Cf., CuRRI,

SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws

705, n. 46

(1963):

"It begs the question to suggest . . .that choice-of-law rules themselves embody the
policy of the state. The question is whether choice-of-law rules intelligently further
the specific policies embodied in the state's municipal law."
55. Hart, The Relatio s Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUX. L. REv. 489,

512 (1954).
56. 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949). Cohen concerned the posting of a bond in stockholder derivative suits. Concurring with Justice Douglas, Frankfurter believed that
"regulations governing the institution of suits in (state) courts" should not be controlling even under the Erie-York doctrine because they do not "define, qualify, or delimit the cause of action or otherwise relate to it." Id. at 557.
57. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
58. Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diver-

sity Litigation,36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962) ; Whicher, The Erie Doctrine and the Seventh
Amendiment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict, 37 TEXAs L. REv. 549 (1959) ;
Note, Diversity Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent Federal Forum, 39 IND.
L.J. 582 (1964) ; Comment, The Ctstitutional Power of Congress to Control Procedure

in the Federal Courts, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 560 (1961).

NOTES
courts are necessarily active expositors of state policy-the failure of the
post-Erie jurisprudence to expedite that policy in a positive manner is illustrated by a recent federal court opinion.
THE ROLE OF A FEDERAL COURT-POLICY CONFLICTS AND

THE NEUTRAL FORUM
The role of a federal court as an expositor of state policy is illus-

trated by the case of Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store,59 a
1959 decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Waynick was a
diversity action arising out of an automobile accident in Michigan. Waynick, a Michigan resident, brought suit in a United States district court
in Illinois against the alleged Chicago seller of liquor to an intoxicated
person seeking recovery of damages sustained when an automobile in
which the plaintiffs were riding was allegedly struck in Michigan by a
car driven by the intoxicated person. Plaintiffs predicated their action
on three alternative grounds: 1) the Michigan Liquor Control Act;6"
2) the Illinois Dram Shop Act; 6 and 3) common-law action. Both the
Michigan Liquor Control Act and the Illinois Dram Shop Act created a
cause of action against the seller of intoxicating liquors where the sale
was made to an intoxicated person who was later involved in an accident
which injured the plaintiff and that accident was proximately caused by
his intoxication. The court of appeals after analyzing the two statutes,
which were virtually identical, concluded on the basis of minimal state
authority that neither act was intended to cover a situation where the
sale was made in one state and the injury occurred in another state.6 2
However, prefacing its statement with the comment "As Aristotle said,
'nature abhors a vacuum'; so does the law,"6 the court proceeded to decide that the common law provided a remedy for an injury such as the
one in Waynick. The court was dearly "result-reaching," as Judge
Knoch pointed out in his dissent, for to hold that the common law did
cover the situation would mean that the Dram Shop Act merely restated
the common law. But it is clear that the common law did not create a
59. 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959).
60. MlICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 18.993, 18.1000 (1957).
61.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (1957).

62. The only case in point that was cited as authority 'by the court is Eldridge v.

Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 158, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950). There the Illinois
Court of Appeals had held that the Dram Shop Act did not extend to injuries outside
the state. That decision is of questionable authority in view of the recent opinion of
the Illinois Supreme Court in Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432,
176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). The Michigan authority, though discussed, was not cited and
a survey of the Michigan decisions indicates that the point was in fact still open in
Michigan.
63. 269 F.2d at 324-25.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cause of action against the seller of intoxicating liquor to a tortfeasor."
It would appear that a federal court is in a singularly appropriate
position to reach a proper decision in a case such as Waynick. It was
clear that Michigan and Illinois had both considered the problems involved and that they had both concluded that an injured person should
have a cause of action against the seller of intoxicants to an already intoxicated potential tortfeasor. It seems that there is no sound reason
why the court should resort to the obviously fictitious "result-reaching"
that it apparently felt was necessary to achieve a just result and still comply with the mandate of the York case. While the court does not cite
York, it is clear that it felt restrained by the outcome-determinative test
because prior state cases had indicated that the respective acts had no extraterritorial effect.8 ' Rigid application of the York outcome-determinative test would have resulted in a legal conclusion that the court felt
clearly denied justice to the plaintiff, and the court was thus forced to
resort to the fiction that the common law provided a remedy. It is submitted that the federal court should have recognized that Michigan and
Illinois, having both passed legislatively on the question of public policy
involved, had determined that plaintiffs in cases such as these should
have a cause of action. What difference then that the intoxicated person
crosses a state line? Where the public policy of both states involved is
clear, a federal court should not shy away from giving effect to that
policy merely because the states involved were not willing to extend legislative jurisdiction to acts culminating in another state.
The analysis of Erie presented here would require the federal court
in cases such as Waynick to give full effect to known state policy. Had
the federal court in the Waynick case viewed the state policy in question
as a coherent whole resulting from the combination of both states' law,
the court could have found the plaintiff to have a cause of action under
the combined statutes. That finding clearly would have comported with
the legislative will of both states, and it would have allowed the court to
refrain from the common-law fiction which was employed.
64. Id. at 327 (dissenting opinion).
65. Id. at 324. Illinois has been one of the leaders in the movement to extend jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants who commit acts which result in injury within the
state. See Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961) ; Note, JurisdictionExpanded-the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 44 IoWA L. R.v.
361 (1959).
Here the opposite situation is present: the defendant is an Illinois corporation which has committed an act which resulted in injury outside of the state. Moreover, the construction of the "Dram Shop Act" by the lower Illinois courts, see Eldridge
v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 158, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950), is an unusual construction of such statutes. Compare, Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d
365 (1957).

NOTES
Quite apart from its lack of judicial craftsmanship the Waynick
opinion suggests a significant problem inherent in the "outcomedeterminative" approach. The problem in Waynick was caused by the
fact that the court of appeals thought that both Michigan and Illinois had
continued to cling to a concept of legislative jurisdiction that was limited
by state boundaries. 6 But the modern trend is in the opposite direction;
states are beginning to recognize that in the mobile society of the space
age, state boundaries are becoming less important as a measure of state
legislative jurisdiction. The increased use of what has been called "concurrent legislative jurisdiction"6 bodes greater ills for our federalism than
Swift v. Tyson ever did, because each extension of legislative jurisdiction
makes further inroads into the primacy of other states' control over the
jural relations of their people. Yet in the new society, those people who
engage in interstate activity must be protected, and eventually the states
must succumb to the temptation to protect their citizens as far away from
home as the due process clause will allow. 8
The implications for such extensions of jurisdiction are patent. Conflict betwveen neighboring states is bound to grow. As one state expands
its jurisdiction to cover a variety of situations which have only minimal
contact with the state asserting jurisdiction, other states must reply in
kind. The eventual erosion of our federal republic into a quarreling
mass of individual states then becomes a real possibility. Would it not
be better to leave such matters to the federal courts? Would not the
''positive" application of state policy in federal tribunals result in less
conflict between the states? Would not the "positive" application of
state policy which was advocated for situations such as the Waynick case
66. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill.
App. 158, 95 N.E.2d 512
(1950). Cf., Gray v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d
761 (1961). The reasoning in Eldridge is of dubious validity in the light of Gray. The
Court of Appeals did not cite any authority for their view of Michigan law.
67. See, Carpenter, Conflicts: Concurrent Legislative .urisdiction in Determining
Tort Liability, 45 MARQ. L. Rv. 1 (1961). Legislative jurisdiction is here separated
from judicial jurisdiction. We are thus not concerned with the so-called "long-arm"
statutes but rather with extension of power to control out-of-state transactions that
possess no contact with the forum state. See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd. 377
U.S. 179 (1964) ; cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
68. The important factor to be recognized in this regard is the extension of statutory power to acts and individuals outside of a particular state. The so-called "longarm" statutes, see, e.g., 2 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 110 § 17, extend judicial jurisdiction to persons who have certain minimum contacts with the state. McGee v. International Life
Ins., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). But beyond such extensions lies another area of jurisdiction
that is becoming increasingly more important. Where the sole contact with the forum
state is a tort committed against a citizen of that state while in another state, does the
forum state have jurisdiction to bring the tortfeasor into its courts and adjudicate the
claim? While no state has yet attempted to go this far, the increasingly interstate nature
of American society may in the future argue persuasively for such pluralistic legislative
and judicial jurisdiction. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 262.05 (Supp. 1965).
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contribute to the preservation of the autonomy of state governments and
judicial systems? It seems that the answer to these questions is clearly
affirmative. In the near future the Supreme Court will be forced to begin anew to define the outer limits of the constitutional power of the
states to extend legislative jurisdiction to interstate transactions. It is
beyond doubt that the availability of a viable forum for the vindication of
legal rights will strongly affect those determinations. The availability of
federal courts that are enforcing state policy in a positive manner, as opposed to the "negative restraint" approach of the Klaxon-York days,
would no doubt make the resolution of the difficult problems of the
future less distasteful.
One prerequisite for enabling the federal courts to fulfill this function is to free them from the Klaxon rule and allow them to formulate
their own choice of law doctrines in diversity cases.8 9 In considering this
issue, one must distinguish the factors involved in imposing a federal
conflicts law upon state courts from those involved in the development of
an independent conflicts law operative in the federal courts.
Professor Brainerd Currie in his definitive article, The Constitution
and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function," argues persuasively against federal judicial intervention in state
choice of law questions. Professor Currie believes that "at the least, before subordinating a specific interest of its own state, a court should appraise realistically the likelihood that its action will result in the desired
condition of uniformity and stability and should carefully calculate the
price which it is committing the state to pay for the expected result.""
In turn, he "find [s] it difficult to escape a conclusion that such a calculation and appraisal is essentially a political function, and that neither the
science of jurisprudence nor its offspring, the conflict of laws, can afford
much guidance for its performance."7 The analysis of the essentially political function of state choice of law doctrine is equally applicable, Professor Currie believes, to federal choice of law problems; and he thus rejects his earlier position in which he argued on behalf of "freedom for
the federal courts to make their own choice of law. .

.

. ""

It is sug-

69. Compare in this regard, CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1963); Symposium, New Trends in. the Conflict of Laws, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
673 (1963) (Papers by: Reese, Ehrenzweig, Leflor, Cavers, Currie, Neuhaus, De Nova,
Wengler, and Nadelman); Cavers, Klaxon Meinwrandum, in ALl, STUDY OF THE DlViSI N OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (TENT. DRAFT No. 1, 1963).
70. 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 9 (1958).

71. Id. at 82.
72. Ibid.
73. Id. at 84, n. 333; and see, Currie, Change of Venie and the Conflict of Laws,
22 U. Cm. L. REV. 405 (1955), and its sister article, Change of Venue and the Conflict
of Laws: A Retraction, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 341 (1960).
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gested that Professor Currie has too lightly abandoned his prior position
on the basis of an inapposite analysis.
The basis of Professor Currie's rejection of the advisability of federal intervention in the state determination of choice of law rules is based
to a large extent on the fact that the Supreme Court in such cases is faced
with a clear policy determination by the court of the state which exercised
initial judicial jurisdiction on the facts of the case presented. The argument against federal judicial intervention in such cases is, as Professor
Currie has so ably pointed out, exceedingly strong. But the conflict, or
apparent conflict, between that position and the question of federal determination of choice of law rules at the trial level in diversity cases may
disappear when it is recognized that a federal trial court, while it may
seek to determine state policy in regard to the legal construct before it,
does not make authoritativestate policy beyond that case. The intervention in the internal political affairs of the state or states involved is thus
minimal. In contrast, the countervailing considerations of the integrity
of the federal judicial process and the constitutional considerations implicit in every federal "choice" of law (which considerations Professor
Currie has found to be outweighed by notions of federalism and "separation of powers" 4 in state conflict of laws questions) may inveigh in
favor of federal "intervention" in diversity cases. The position taken
here advocates the latter approach. It is asserted that the constitutional
problems implicit in choice of law problems in diversity of citizenship
cases are demonstrably different from those posed by cases coming out
of the state courts. The federal forum by virtue of its "independent"
stature is, it is believed, constitutionally compelled by the concept of due
process to give recognition to the state which possesses the balance of
substantial contact with the operative facts of a given litigation. Subordination in a federal court of legal rights that arise independently of the
forum state to the peculiar political decisions of that state may, and it
seems, often does, deny due process of law to litigants properly entitled
to an independent federal determination of their legal rights. In order
to properly protect the legal rights involved in a given case, a methodology
is needed which allows sufficient flexibility in choice and application of
legal principles to assure proper deference to the interests of every interested party and government. Part of the great difficulty inhibiting
the development of such a methodology has been the inclination to carry
every proposal to an extreme (for example, the extreme freedom of
Swift v. Tyson and the extreme woodenness of Guaranty Trust v. York)
74.

The descriptive terms "federalism" and "separation of powers" are the choice

of the writer and not necessarily the words chosen by Professor Currie.
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instead of accommodating conflicting interests and retaining the flexibility necessary to allow the dynamics of the judicial process to operate.
In order properly to apply the principles of Erie,the proposition must
be recognized that the York "derailment" was merely a repetition of the
basic theoretical error of Swift v. Tyson. York and Swift both attempted
to answer difficult problems by reference to a static analysis of legal rules.
York was an abortive attempt to introduce rigid legal standards to govern
the most sensitive problem of federalism: the accommodation of federal
and state interest in areas where conflict, both among states and between
federal and state courts, is inevitable. The area of conflicts of interest
between state and federal governments inherent in diversity jurisdiction
must be faced on a flexible basis, determining on each set of facts where
the interests lie and apportioning to each sovereign the interests which
are his. Any approach predicated upon "outcome" must in many instances
reach an improper result because it tends to ignore the conflicting policy
that so often arises in diversity cases and leaves the determination of that
conflict to an interested party, the forum state.
After the Erie decision, the courts initially sought to distinguish by
resort to the historic "procedure-substance" distinction the areas where
primacy of local control was necessary."5 That distinction attempted in
a general way to define those rules of law which merely described methods
of orderly decision-making and to separate them from those rules of law
which expressed a rational policy."6 Yet, the use of those labels caused
difficulty because procedural rules may and often do have strong
policy considerations behind them. Lawyers are accustomed to dealing
with the terms procedure and substance, yet the normal uses of the term
in day-to-day litigation are not exactly parallel to the uses of the terms
necessary for the proper application of the Erie doctrine. Reintroduction,
therefore, of the "procedure-substance" distinction would not serve a
useful purpose.
Yet, the "procedure-substance" distinction did attempt to characterize the basic elements that distinguished various types of law. In
many cases the distinction was workable, but as was so often pointed out,
the penumbral area where procedure fades into substance could not be
defined in terms of the two antithetical categories themselves. That
proposition was given tacit recognition by Congress in the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934,11 where it was provided that the regulation of pro75. See notes 26-31 and accompanying text
76. See, e.g., Ailes, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 39 MicH. L.
Rxv. 392 (1941); Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE

L.J. 333 (1933).
77. Rules Enabling Act, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934).
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cedure was not to be used as a subterfuge for regulating substance." The
recent Supreme Court decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop. 9 may
indicate an intention on the part of the United States Supreme Court to
re-evaluate the problems posed by the "procedure-substance" distinction.
But Byrd, as it now stands, is probably limited to a relatively small area
where a clear congressional, if not constitutional, mandate conflicts with
a state rule that relates to judicial housekeeping.8" It is relatively clear
now that the Supreme Court will not feel literally bound by state housekeeping rules even though they may seriously affect the outcome of a
case. Partially inspired by the Byrd decision and perhaps more importantly by a desire for a workable approach to diversity jurisdiction,
scholars, lawyers, judges, and students have continually attempted with
varying degrees of success to distill Erie into meaningful formulas. A
recent note writer has suggested redefinition along lines defined as "directive" and "sanctional." ' 1 Federal judges would be required under that
approach to follow "directive" law and be free to use "sanctional" laws
with a modicum of creativity. The note defines directive laws as those
laws which tell people what to do in their day-to-day activities. Sanctional laws are likewise defined as those laws which define the means
and remedies by which abberrations from directive standards are corrected. It is immediately apparent however, as Professor Wright has
suggested, that the distinction is little more "than a return under more
sophisticated labels to the distinction between 'substance' and 'procedure'
first announced in the Erie case itself."8 2 Professor Wright suggests that
78. The act provided in part: "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe . . . the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and
procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions. Such rules shall
not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right ..
" Ibid.

79. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).

80. See authorities cited note 58 supra.
81.

Note, Of Lawyers and Laymen: A Study of Federalism, the Judicial Process,
YALE L.J. 344 (1961).
82. W IuGT, FEDERAL COURTS 213 (1963). Even if the note goes deeper than Professor Wright suggests, which perhaps it does, it still ignores the plain fact that many, if
not most, law suits do not involve application of "directive" laws with a view to controlling conduct in the future but rather application of legal consequences to a series of
completed activities undertaken by the litigants without any regard whatsoever to the
legal obligations that may be imposed upon the actor. For example, the legal definition
of negligence implies lack of awareness of legal obligation and to that extent it is difficult to apply the "directive" category to it. On the other hand, the "sanctional" category does not apply because the rules of negligence law express a rational state policy
in regard to the results which should attach to certain classes of conduct. In addition it
is readily apparent that a clear state policy may be behind many "sanctional" rules; e.g.,
wrongful death statutes express a state policy in favor of destroying the common-law
rule that the cause of action died with the plaintiff; in a like manner many other sanctional or procedural rules embody clear, rational state determinations of operative legal
policy. The note, however does recognize the elementary Elie command, i.e., recognition
of the primacy of the state policy-making structure, made operative through legal rules.
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we may have "no alternative but to leave questions such as these for the
ad hoc determination of judges keenly aware of their responsibilities to
two sovereigns." s" But somewhere between the free-wheeling approach
suggested by Professor Wright and the static approach imposed by the
outcome-determinative test there must lie a middle ground which can
afford meaningful standards for judicial selection of applicable law.
Certainly federal judges, who carry a substantial burden as it is, would
prefer to have some guidelines in their approach to the uses of state law
in diversity jurisdiction.
THE QUEST FOR "STATE POLICY"

As was seen above, both York and Swift operated on the premise
that "one august corpus" of law, state law in York and common law in
Swift, existed a priori. The error in that view is patent. Legal rules, as
Justice Holmes so forcefully pointed out, do not exist independently of
the facts of a case and the concomitant judicial decision based upon
those facts. If the facts of a given case have not been before a court
under substantially similar circumstances, it is difficult to say that a preexistent legal rule is dispositive. What state law should apply to a given
case in the federal courts thus depends on a number of varying factors
both factual and legal.84 Yet a judge is called upon to render a decision
"on the law" and to justify that decision on the basis of "precedent." In
so doing the judge is forced to deal selectively with a plethora of often
conflicting "legal rules," choosing those which lend rational support to
his decision and discarding those which do not. Yet it must be recognized
that by the very act of selection, the judge has in a real sense imposed his
own notion of what the law "is," or "ought" to be, upon the litigants.
This seems an unavoidable and not wholly undesirable characteristic of
a dynamic legal system, for a good judge may thus lend an element of
rationality to what must often seem to lay litigants an essentially nonrational process. It follows then that a federal judge faced with unclear
state determinations must approach the selective process with the same
sense of informed and creative rationality that he would employ in any
other case.
But from where do the standards for such "creativity" come? If
the Wright approach is too ad hoc to allow the development of meaningIn addition it has the merit of reviving the notion that not all state rules need be followed by a federal court-a point too often overlooked.
83. WRIGHT, FEDERAL CoURTS 213 (1963).
84. The question of what a judge sitting in a diversity case must do when the
"law" is unclear is discussed fully in Ascertainment of State Law in Federal Diversity
Cases, 40 IND. L.J. 541 (1965).
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ful legal categories by which men may judge their everyday affairs, and
the old alternative of "procedure-substance" is inadequate to provide the
essential justice sought, is there a third alternative which will provide a
ready answer? It seems clear that after nearly thirty years of debate the
problems of Erie cannot be resolved by a simple test offered in a student
note. However, the methods previously used to solve the recurring Erie
problems have failed for one major reason: the failure to properly accommodate state policy determinations, either by giving undue effect to
minor policies or by giving too little effect to major policies. It is in the
quest for determination of state policy properly operative in diversity
cases rather than the applicationof determined state policies that the difficult problems lie. In this regard, "policy," though perhaps implicit in
every legal rule, varies in degree of intensity of interest on the part of
state authority. Some legal rules are expressive of a basic social design
and others are merely intended to resolve recurring factual situations.
This distinction has gained tacit recognition by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the decision in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop." in
regard to the procedure to be followed in the federal district courts, and
it is equally applicable to "substantive" matters. Whether it will be so
applied is a question that can hopefully be answered in the affirmative,
in light of a recent decision of the Supreme Court.
On April 26, 1965, the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Hanna v. Plummer, which holds that it is incorrect to assume that the
"rule of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins constitutes an appropriate test of the validity and therefore the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure."" While this is a relatively narrow holding, broad dicta indicate
that the court may be ready to retreat from the full blown outcomedeterminative test of York in all matters governed by the Erie doctrine.
The court of appeals in the Hanna case had held that the "in hand" service required in actions against executors was part of an affirmative state
policy directed toward assuring executors of receiving "actual" notice of
suits. In reversing the court of appeals and holding that the requirements
of Federal Rule 4(d) 1 were sufficient, the court rejected the argument
that the Massachusetts rule was "important" to the state:
85. 356 U.S. 525 (1958); and see, Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye
View of Federalism inb Diversity Litigation, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962); Whicher, The
Eric Doctrine and the Seventh Amendment: A Suggested Resolution of Their Conflict,
37 TEXAs L. REv. 549 (1959); Comment, The ConstitutionalPower of Congress to Con-

trol Procedure in the Federal Courts, 56 Nw. U. L.

REv.

560 (1961) ; Note, Diversity

Jurisdiction: State Policy and the Independent Federal Forun, 39 IND. LJ. 582 (1964).
86. 380 U.S. 460, 469-70 (1965).
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One cannot meaningfully ask how important something is without first asking "important for what purpose ?" Erie and its
progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state
law, the importance of the state rule is indeed relevant, but only
in the context of asking whether application of the rule would
make so important a difference to the character or result of the
litigation that failure to enforce it would unfairly discriminate
against citizens of the forum state.

.

..

The clear implication of this language is that the court is now prepared
to go behind a state rule to inquire into the relevant policy considerations
upon which it is based. This at least is the first step on the long road
that leads back to the Erie view of federalism. How far a majority of the
court is prepared to go in an attempt to return to the basic principles of
the Erie decision is, of course, as yet unclear ;"5 but Mr. justice Harlan in
his concurring opinion clearly adopts the position taken by Professors
Hart and Wechsler:
I have always regarded [the Erie] decision as one of the modern
cornerstones of our federalism, expressing policies that profoundly touch the allocation of judicial power between the state
and federal systems. Erie recognized that there should not be
two conflicting systems of law controlling the primary activity
of citizens, for such alternative governing authority must necessarily give rise to a debilitating uncertainty in the planning of
everyday affairs. .

.

. The court is quite right in stating that

the "outcome determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York, 326 U.S. 99 . . . if taken literally, proves too much, for
any rule, no matter how clearly "procedural," can affect the
outcome of litigation if it is not obeyed. .

.

. To my mind the

proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a state
or a federal rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural," is to
87.
88.
. .
are
but

Id. at 468, n. 9.
See, e.g., Mr. Justice Warren speaking for the court:
. the message of York itself is that choices between state and federal law
to be made not by application of any automatic, "litmus paper" criterion,
rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.

Id. at 467.

Justice Warren then goes on to state that the underlying policies of Erie are based
upon equal protection of the laws. That statement, if in fact it is an assertion of the
constitutional basis of Erie, would seem to support the "due process" view taken here.
At the very least, "equal protection" insofar as it becomes operative in the federal system must derive from the due process clause of the fifth amendment since the "equal
protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment is limited to state actions.
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of administrative considerations but which can be manipulated so
that its implementation happily results in approximately a fifty per cent
reduction in the federal diversity case load. The theoretical premise is
not at all difficult to locate in the Institute's thinking:
[A] ccess to the fedaral courts because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties should be permitted only upon a showing
of strong reasons therefor and only to the extent that these
reasons justify. This premise is grounded upon the political
axiom, advanced by Hamilton in justification of the federal
judicial power, that judicial and legislative authority should be
coextensive. So long as federal courts continue to decide cases
arising under State law without the possibility of State review,
the State's judicial power is less extensive than its legislative
power; this is an undesirable interference with State autonomy.3
However, as it is expressed this premise has some gaping holes in it:
what the Institute considers to be included in the concept of "state autonomy," how state autonomy is being interfered with, or why this interference is undesirable are never explained. But perhaps the most striking defect in the premise is that it bears no obvious relationship at all to
the initial motive for the study-the need for more efficient administration in the federal courts.
It is hoped that the studies made in this symposium will be relevant
in evaluating both the theoretical validity of this premise and the practical
usefulness of the Institute's proposals.

THE OPERATION OF FEDERALISM IN DIVERSITY:
ERIE'S CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
In the most general terms, the great debate over diversity jurisdiction has concerned itself with the problem of the proper functional limitations upon the federal courts exercising that jurisdiction. Although
most of the debaters share a common belief that diversity jurisdiction has
become an integral part of the governmental structure within which the
limiting standards must be developed, occasional critics have offered
the ultimate solution-abolition of diversity jurisdiction.1 The more
3. A. L. I., op. cit. szpra at 49.
1. See, e.g., Boner, Erie v. Tompkins, A Study in Judicial Precedent, 40 TEXAS L
Rtv. 509, 619 (1962) ; Clark, State Law in, the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946) ; Clark, Diversity of Citizenship

